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EQUALITY: THE MOST 
DIFFICULT RIGHT 
The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C.
*
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees a panoply of 
rights — democratic rights, liberty rights, the right to free expression and to 
follow the religion of one’s choice, rights of association, rights against undue 
intrusion of the state in the guise of the police power and the right to a fair trial. 
And like most modern bills of rights, it guarantees equality. Of all the rights, 
this is the most difficult. 
The Canadian Charter1 guarantees equality not just in one way, but in four — 
we are declared to be equal before the law, equal under the law, entitled to equal 
benefit of the law and to the equal protection of the law. Its framers were 
determined to pre-empt the restrictive interpretations that courts had placed on the 
guarantee of “equality before the law” used in the Charter’s predecessor 
document, the Bill of Rights.2 They gave the courts clear, unequivocal 
instructions: This is a guarantee of equality. Take it seriously. Don’t cut it down. 
Interpret it in a meaningful and expansive way. 
The challenge was exciting. But it has also proved daunting. The language of 
equality is so open and general that it is difficult to assign it precise legal 
meaning. At the same time, every nuance is critical. Too narrow an interpretation, 
and one sends the law down the formalistic cul de sac of Lavell3 and Bliss.4 Too 
broad an interpretation, and one risks undermining long-standing social 
institutions and upsetting the careful equilibria crafted by Parliament and the 
legislatures to maintain social stability. 
* Chief Justice of Canada. This paper was originally presented at the April 6, 2001 
conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth Annual Analysis of the Constitutional 
Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional Development Program at Osgoode Hall 
Law School. 
1  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2  Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 
1997), at 1240. 
3  Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349. 
4  Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183. 





In the next few minutes, I would like to explore with you some thoughts on 
our encounters with equality thus far: first, why the right is so difficult; second, 
the three rocks of certainty that have emerged in modern equality flunking; and 
finally, the different goals of equality and how they may impact on future 
developments. 
First, let me address the difficulty of defining equality. Canadians are not the 
only ones who find equality difficult. Sidney Verba and Gary Orren argue that 
few issues have sparked more controversy or held more sway over the course of 
history than equality. “Ships have been launched, lives given, governments 
toppled — all in the name of this one ideal.”5 
And this ideal is not a simple one. In his 1990 analysis of the rhetorical force 
of equality in moral and legal discourse, Professor Peter Westen lists just some 
of the adjectives used by lawyers and philosophers over the years to describe 
the concept of equality. These include “strange and difficult,” “complex,” 
“intricate,” ambiguous,” “elusive,” “slippery” and “mysterious.”6 To underline 
his point, he notes that his book on equality was, by conservative estimate, one 
of 30 to 40 books on the topic that were expected to be published in English 
that year. His book also followed the publication of 370 books about equality in 
the decade from 1978 to 1987.7 
Westen argues that while people seem to share the concept of equality, they 
have very different conceptions of it, and he points to the difference of opinion 
that exists about what “equality” on grounds of “sex” means under the Equal 
Rights Amendment (ERA) in the U.S.A. Everyone agrees that the ERA would 
render men and women equal under the law, but people have different 
conceptions of what such sexual equality means. Some people contend, and some 
deny, that it will require men and women to be treated interchangeably for 
purposes of military combat duty. Others contend, and others deny, that it 
mandates subsidized abortions for indigent women, legitimates homosexual 
marriage, or outlaws separate athletic teams and events for men and women. 
Indeed, the 17 states that have adopted ERAs of their own differ considerably in 
their interpretations of what such equality means.8 
The Supreme Court of Canada itself has commented on the difficulties posed 
by section 15. In 1989, in its first decision dealing with section 15 of the Charter, 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, McIntyre J., speaking for the Court, 
5  Verba and Orren, Equality in America: The View from the Top (Cambridge, Mass.; 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 1985), at 1, cited in Westen, Speaking of Equality: An 
Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of “Equality” in Moral and Legal Discourse (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), at 59. 
6  Westen, supra, note 5, at 61. 
7  Id., at 285. 
8  Id., at xv-xvi. 





remarked that “more than any of the other rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
Charter, [the equality right] lacks precise definition.”9 Ten years later, in Law v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Iacobucci J. described 
section 15 as “perhaps the Charter’s most conceptually difficult provision.”10 He 
noted that one of the difficulties in defining the concepts of “equality” and 
“discrimination” is the abstract nature of the words and the similarly abstract 
nature of words used to explain them. No single word or phrase can fully describe 
the content and purpose of section 15(1). Part of the difficulty in defining the 
concept of equality, he said, stems from its exalted status: 
 
The quest for equality expresses some of humanity’s highest ideals and aspirations, 
which are by their nature abstract and subject to differing articulations. The 
challenge for the judiciary in interpreting and applying s. 15(l) of the Charter is to 
transform these ideals and aspirations into practice in a manner which is 
meaningful to Canadians and which accords with the purpose of the provision.11 
 
Difficulties in defining and applying concepts of equality are not restricted to 
common-law systems. Susanne Baer, of Humboldt University’s School of Law 
in Berlin, states that almost every German analysis of the subject opens with 
two observations: “first, the right to equality is the most frequently cited right 
in the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court and, second, the 
equality doctrine is the area of constitutional law containing the greatest 
number of conundrums.”12 Courts and policy makers around the world have 
struggled with the meaning of equality and with its limits — limits that are 
shaped by the political and social histories of the countries involved. 
Equality’s track record is clear. It is the Leviathan of rights. It has humbled the 
most sophisticated legal minds, the most refined and liberal legal systems. We in 
Canada should therefore not be surprised if we encounter difficulty with this, the 
most difficult right. 
The difficulties in interpreting equality stem from a number of sources. The 
first, as noted, is the generality of equality language. In every country, courts 
punctuate their struggles with equality with references to the fact that equality can 
mean anything and everything, from minimal protection of democratic rights at 
one end of the spectrum to full economic equality at the other. What constitutes 
equality in a given situation is a matter open to debate and argument. 
9  [1989] 1 S.C.R 143, at 164. 
10  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at 507. 
11  Id. 
12  Baer, “Constitutional Equality: Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German 
Constitutional Court” (1999), 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 249, at 249. 





This brings us to a second difficulty. Equality debates usually turn on the 
proponent’s view of society and what it should be. This raises the question of 
whether the courts can capture the complexity of social life in a way that 
permits them to make the best decisions. At a more abstract level, who should 
be making fundamental decisions about the kind of society we have — the 
legislatures or the courts? Again, should the law preserve the social status quo, 
or should it seek to change?13 And underlying the question of how far to go in 
changing things is the fact that the Canadian equality guarantee, like the 
equality guarantees of most modern democracies, has been superimposed on a 
system that espouses a market economy and the importance of open 
competition. 
A third difficulty is that the reality of equality can never meet its promise. 
Equality is not only the Leviathan of rights; it is also a Tantalus. It promises 
more than it can deliver. 
The diversity of our society and its foundation in the competition of the 
marketplace mean that absolute substantive equality is impossible. It is beyond 
the resources of society and the law to place everyone in exactly the same 
position of relative advantage and disadvantage, even if we wished to. And 
even that is in doubt. German scholar Susanne Baer, writing against the history 
of a totalitarian Reich that idealized the unity of the people, warns against “the 
nightmare of the equality state of total conformity.”14 A market-based 
representative democracy necessarily tolerates a certain degree of disparity, 
economic and otherwise. It is perhaps for this reason that the Canadian equality 
experience, expressed in human rights legislation as well as in the enumerated 
grounds of section 15, focuses on particular sources of inequality which have 
historically proved unjust and harmful to the affected individuals and to society 
as a whole. 
So we must accept that equality in our society is not a simple matter. Yet, the 
same experience that confirms the difficulty of equality points to the solutions. 
This brings me to my second point — the emerging rocks of certainty on which 
we can anchor our evolving jurisprudence. 
The first is the rock of substantive or material equality, as contrasted with formal 
Aristotelian equality. Substantive equality recognizes the fallacy of formal equality 
— that it permits discriminatory acts simply by classifying groups as “unalike.” 
Substantive equality is founded on the principle that all human beings are of equal 
worth and possessed of the same innate human dignity, which the law must uphold 
and protect, not just in form, but in substance. 
13  Baer, id., at 280, lists these as challenges for German law. 
14  Id., at 273. 





Substantive equality comes with a venerable lineage. Liberal German 
scholars of the Weimar Republic held that equality is not a right against formal 
distinctions alone, but against inappropriate, irrelevant or unjust distinctions. 
After the defeat of the formal totalitarian equality of the Third Reich, the new 
Federal Republic adopted substantive equality (sometimes translated as 
“material equality”) as the Grundnorm of the 1945 German constitution.15 
Substantive equality thinking is reflected in the United States cases like Brown 
v. Board of Education16 and its progeny, although the emphasis on 
individualism in the United States has arguably prevented its unambiguous 
realization.17 French historical experience has led to an acceptance of the state 
actively seeking to ensure equality.18 And in recent decades, as we all know, 
substantive equality has been affirmed throughout Europe, as well as in 
Canada, Israel and South Africa. 
Substantive equality is recognized worldwide as the governing legal 
paradigm. It is here to stay. We can count on it. But we must also recognize that 
it introduces a new difficulty that formal equality did not possess — the need to 
decide when a distinction is inappropriate or unjust. Substantive equality 
requires the court to determine whether a given situation is “substantially the 
same” or “substantially unlike” another. Here we find ourselves back in the 
uncertain sea of value judgements. Every Canadian scholar of section 15 knows 
the result. Relevance, disadvantaged group, human dignity — these concepts 
and more attest to our search for a simple rule that will indicate whether a 
particular distinction treats persons in a way that is substantially the same or 
substantially different. 
Whatever words are used, drawing the line between appropriate and 
inappropriate, just and unjust, distinctions, inevitably involves the courts in 
weighing and balancing conflicting values. Is the impugned distinction justified 
when judged against the legislative goal, or is it not? This poses Canadian 
courts a challenge not faced by courts in many other countries. Our equality 
guarantee is subject not only to the internal proportionality constraints inherent 
in substantive equality, but also to the separate proportionality constraint of 
section 1 of the Charter. How do we work the two together while avoiding 
redundancy or reducing section 1 to a mere formality?19 
15  Id., at 259-60. 
16  344 U.S. 141 (1952). 
17  Vroom, “Equal Protection Versus The Principal of Equality: American and French 
Views on Equality in the Law” (1992), 21 Cap. U. L. Rev. 199. 
18  Id. 
19  See Bredt and Nishisato, “The Supreme Court’s New Equality Test: A Critique” 
(September-October 2000), 8 Canada Watch 16. 





As important as substantive equality is, it comes with a price tag — the price 
of having to determine what distinctions are just, or fair, or equal, and which 
are not. It is a price we must accept and find a way to pay. For we cannot go 
back on substantive equality. Substantive equality is the only equality for our 
time, and we cannot turn back the pages of history even if we wished to. 
If substantive equality is the first rock of modern equality doctrine, it is 
supported by a second — the idea that equality is concerned not with the letter 
of the law, but also with effects. It is not enough to look at the facial distinction 
the statute makes to determine whether it is appropriate. If our goal is 
substantive equality, we must look to the actual effect of the law or government 
action on the lives of men, women and children. This idea, too, is now widely 
accepted in Western equality jurisprudence. But again, it brings its own 
difficulty — how are courts to ascertain the social effects of a law? Unlike 
Parliament, courts cannot conduct social research, test existing research or hire 
experts to advise and consult. Nor, as bodies activated by principle, can they 
use arbitrary compromise to resolve intractable issues that divide social groups. 
Courts must rely on the parties to adduce and critique the evidence needed to 
assess social effect. Parties may fail to provide complete evidence and forceful 
critiques for a variety of reasons. How then is the Court to make the necessary 
evaluation? We can only do what we can within the limits of our constitutional 
role and our institutional resources. 
The third rock of modern equality jurisprudence is the concept that the right 
to like treatment invokes a comparable right to unlike treatment. It is not 
enough to treat those in substantially similar situations alike; the law must also 
treat those in substantially different situations differently to avoid inappropriate 
distinctions and discrimination. Again, this idea has attained virtual consensus 
in modern equality doctrine. 
As Ackermann J. of the South African Constitutional Court has explained: 
 
We need [ ... ] to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognizes that 
although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of 
equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon 
identical treatment in all circumstances before the goal is achieved. Each case, 
therefore, will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its 
overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not. A 
classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in the 
different context.20 
20  The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v. Minister of Justice 
and Others 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W), at para. 61 citing with approval President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another v. Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), at para. 41. 





While widely accepted, the idea that equality embraces both like and unlike 
treatment also imports its difficulties. Must the law compensate for every 
difference and disadvantage suffered by every person? This seems impossible. 
Laws by their nature are general, applying to everyone or to everyone within a 
designated group. Laws carve out exceptions, true, but the exceptions are also 
focused on classes or groups of people. So laws by their nature are inconsistent 
with the idea that all differences must be addressed and erased. But on the other 
hand, if every individual has the right to equal treatment, as the Charter 
pronounces, how can we justify the law’s undue impact due to individual 
differences? Alternatively, if we accept that the best that can be done is to 
recognize class differences, where do we draw the line? How large or 
significant must the class be before the law recognizes the right to differential 
treatment? And when does different treatment to compensate for different 
situations cross the line and become a special advantage creating, rather than 
reducing, inequality? The answer, of course, is that the line between equality 
and inequality here, as elsewhere, depends on whether the difference is viewed 
as “substantial” or significant. 
So we arrive at this point. Amid all the difficulty and confusion that surrounds 
modern equality doctrine, three rocks have emerged upon which we can ground 
future developments with confidence that we are heading in the right direction — 
the rocks of substantive equality, equality of effect and equality expressed both 
through like treatment and unlike treatment. Each comes with its own profound 
problems. Our task is to acknowledge and explore these problems to the end of 
preserving the values embodied in the new equality while building a legal 
structure that offers reasonable guidance to individuals, groups and legislatures. 
This brings me to the third and final portion of my comments. Many of the 
equality issues we will see in the years to come will be concerned with working out 
the fine points and difficulties of substantive equality, equality of effect and the dual 
like-unlike treatment faces of the guarantee. And many of these issues will be 
bound up with a more general question: the ambit of the equality guarantee — 
whether, and if so to what extent, it should apply outside its traditional 
discrimination-oriented focus. 
It may be helpful to think of equality doctrine in terms of the purposes it 
serves. Let me suggest three related but distinct purposes that can be put 
forward. The first and traditional focus of substantive equality is the goal of 
improving the situation of members of disadvantaged groups. A second purpose 
might be to promote the equal conferral of state benefits. A third purpose or 
concern might be to promote equal status. These focuses are often intertwined. 
A particular case may raise one, two or all three. Yet, often, one emerges as 
dominant, changing the complexion of the case and raising the question of 





whether different goals require different legal treatment, and, if so, how we 
should incorporate this into our equality doctrine. 
The first and arguably primary goal of modern equality law is to improve the 
situation of people belonging to groups that have traditionally suffered 
discrimination. Canada has pursued this goal since the 1960s, when, province by 
province and on the federal level, we adopted human rights codes. The Charter of 
1982 affirmed this goal by referring to discrimination in its opening words and by 
situating the four facets of equality on the fulcrum of the enumerated grounds that 
targeted traditional sources of adverse-effect discrimination. We call this kind of 
equality, directed at actually improving the lives of individuals and society by 
reducing stereotypical discrimination, ameliorative equality. 
The ethos of ameliorative equality dominates recent thinking. Supreme Court 
of Canada decisions repeatedly assert that reversing the harmful effects of 
stereotypical discrimination is the central purpose of section 15. The same 
holds elsewhere. Consider the words of Ackerman J. in The National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v. Minister of Justice, referring to 
section 9(2) of the S.A. Constitution, who has stated: 
 
The State is [ ... ] obliged “to promote the achievement of such equality” by 
“legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories 
of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination,” which envisages remedial 
equality.21 
 
Not surprisingly, given this focus, the principles that guide us in achieving the 
goal of ameliorative equality are relatively clear, at least in their core 
applications. We recognize stereotypical discrimination that demeans and limits 
opportunity and achievement when we see it, and we usually know what to do 
about it. On the periphery, however, questions persist. Even in cases where the 
goal of alleviation of discrimination is paramount, many groups other than those 
enumerated have experienced historic disadvantage. Should all be recognized, or 
only the most egregious? Again, as we move away from the core types of 
discrimination identified by the enumerated grounds, should our standards of 
scrutiny become more flexible, as suggested by the German jurisprudence?22 
However, rectifying the situation of disadvantaged groups is arguably not the 
only type of equality that falls within section 15 of the Charter. The Charter 
positively accords Canadians equal benefit of the law and equal protection from 
the law’s burden. This can be argued to extend the guarantee of equality to 
matters beyond the scope of traditional anti-discrimination law, to the equal 
21  The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v. Minister of Justice 
and Others, supra, note 20, at para. 62. 
22  Baer, supra, note 12. 





provision of state benefits, even where the group excluded is not the object of 
historic discrimination. The primary concern in such cases is not whether the 
group to which the plaintiff belongs has suffered historical disadvantage 
requiring a legal remedy, but whether the state’s largesse has been 
appropriately distributed. This concept of equality is discussed by philosophers 
like John Rawls, and figures in foreign equality jurisprudence such as 
Germany’s.23 
Where the goal is equal distribution of benefits, the rules seem less clear than 
where the goal is amelioration of the downtrodden class’s situation. Must the 
claimant be a member of a disadvantaged group? Could the government, for 
example, cut all men out of a welfare scheme on the ground they are not 
disadvantaged, leaving section 15(2) aside for the moment? What serves as a 
sufficient or substantial distinction between one disadvantaged group and 
another? Where, within groups, can the legislature permissibly draw cut-off 
lines? What about the argument that it is for the legislature to decide how to 
allocate limited resources? Canadian courts have wrestled with these issues in 
Schachter24 and, again, in Law. In Law, the Court upheld Parliament’s power to 
cut off benefits on the basis of age, reasoning that the distinction did not deny the 
complainant’s human dignity. However, issues remain, and the Canadian attempt 
to fit benefit schemes into section 15 doctrine will continue to develop. 
Here, too, Canadians are not alone in their difficulty. Benefit schemes have 
posed difficulty for equality doctrine in other countries, too. In some jurisdictions, 
like Germany, courts increase equality protection in direct relation to how closely 
the benefit at issue engages the liberty interest. For example, a legal aid scheme 
may be constitutionally required, given that it impacts on the equal right of every 
person to a fair court hearing. At the same time, denial of a benefit not linked to 
liberty may be permissible.25 In the Canadian context, this suggests links between 
section 7 and section 15. 
In yet other cases, a third focus may assume primary importance — status. In 
some cases, the tangible burden or benefit may be small or non-existent, and 
the denial of status may become the primary or only grievance. Is a person 
entitled to equal status on the basis of human dignity and equal worth, even 
where no other benefits or burdens are involved? Our Court has not yet faced 
this issue, and I comment on it no further. 
While Canadian courts have arguably begun to make distinctions between 
situations where the goals differ from the classic goal of amelioration of group-
based disadvantages, much terrain remains to be explored. Will we distinguish 
23  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1971). 
24  Schachter v. Canada, [ 1992] 2 S.C.R. 679. 
25  Law, supra, note 10. 




between these and, perhaps, other types of equality claim? If so, on what 
grounds? These questions will doubtless occupy the courts in the years to come. 
Here again, we may find it useful to look abroad. The equality jurisprudence of 
many countries seeks to differentiate between various equality goals by a range of 
jurisprudential devices, like hierarchies of interests, the presence or absence of a 
liberty component and proportionality analyses providing different levels of 
scrutiny for different goals and different cases. It is not yet clear that we must go 
down any or all of these roads. Contrary to experience elsewhere, we may prove 
capable of constructing a simple, unified equality rule that at the same time 
embraces the varied goals of the guarantee. Yet, we are well advised to survey the 
general geography before we chart our new roads and lay down the heavy 
pavement. 
Canadian equality law is in its infancy. We have made a good start by 
founding our jurisprudence on the rocks of substantive equality, effects equality 
and the reality that equality embraces both like and unlike treatment. It remains 
to work out the implications of this beginning. It is a worthy endeavour. 
Mahatma Ghandi taught that if we could eliminate inequality, we could 
eliminate most of the world’s problems. We can never reach complete equality, 
even if we wished to. But we can work to use the law to combat the evils that 
flow from inequality. We can work to remove the barriers, legal and systemic, 
that hold women, men and children back. We can and must work to promote 
the fundamental worth and human dignity of each member of society. We ask 
your help, as scholars of the law, in finding the right answers for equality, the 
most difficult right. 
